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ILLINOIS V. WARDLOW

528 U.S. 119 (2000)
FACTS
Police officers Nolan and Harvey were patrolling a Chicago area known
for drug trafficking when Nolan saw Sam Wardlow, respondent, standing in
front of a building holding an opaque white bag.' Nolan and Harvey were
traveling in the last car of a four car police caravan that consisted of eight
police officers.2 Wardlow allegedly glanced in the direction of the
approaching caravan and fled.3 Officers Nolan and Harvey followed Wardlow
in their car and eventually cornered him.4 Nolan got out of the car and stopped
Wardlow.5 He did not announce that he was a police officer or ask questions
of Wardlow.6 During a pat down search, Officer Nolan recovered a .38 caliber
handgun from Wardlow's bag.7 He arrested respondent at approximately
8
12:00 p.m.
The officers were traveling in a caravan because the area they were
patrolling was known for drug trafficking and they had expected to encounter
numerous drug dealers, buyers, and lookouts.9 In Nolan's experience as a
police officer, weapons were often in the vicinity of drug transactions.'0 This
experience led him to conduct the pat down search of Wardlow." During the
stop and search, Nolan was in uniform, but no evidence established whether
the police cars in the caravan were marked. 2
Wardlow argued that his presence in a high crime area and his flight from
police were insufficient to justify Officer Nolan's stop and frisk.' 3
Nonetheless, the Illinois trial court convicted Wardlow of unlawful use of a
firearm by a felon, denying Wardlow's motion to suppress the gun found
during the stop. 4 Relying on Terry v. Ohio, 5 the Illinois Appellate Court
1. Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 121-122 (2000).
2. Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 121.
3. Id. at 122.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Illinois v. Wardlow, 678 N.E.2d 65, 66 (I1. App. Ct. 1997), aft'd, 701 N.E.2d 484 (II1.1998),
and cert. granted,528 U.S. 119 (2000).
7. Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 122.
8. Id. at 137.
9. Id. at 121.
10. Id. at 122.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 137.
13. Id. at 122-123.
14. Id. at 122.
15. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). In Terry, the Supreme Court considered all the
circumstances of a police officer's stop and search of the petitioner to determine whether the petitioner's
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reversed the trial court's holding because it found that Nolan did not have
reasonable suspicion to make the stop.' 6 The Illinois Appellate Court
concluded that Wardlow was not in a high crime area. 7 The Supreme Court
of Illinois affirmed the appellate court's ruling despite its finding that the
8
testimony was sufficient to establish that Wardlow was in a high crime area.'
The court noted that a stop under such circumstances is unwarranted because
one has a right to flee and to "go on one's way" when an officer's suspicion
of him is unreasonable. 9 Because one's presence in a high crime area is
insufficient, standing alone, to justify a stop, the court held that the stop and
arrest violated the Fourth Amendment20 .2' The United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari to determine whether a reasonable suspicion existed to
support the initial stop. 22 The Court did not consider the lawfulness of the
23
frisk independent of the stop.
HOLDING
The United States Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision, held that one's
presence in an area of heavy narcotics trafficking combined with one's
unprovoked flight upon noticing police creates a reasonable suspicion
justifying a Terry stop and does not violate the Fourth Amendment. 4

Fourth Amendment right to personal security was violated by an unreasonable search and seizure. Id. at 9.
Petitioner sought review of his conviction for carrying a concealed weapon, contending that the weapon
seized from him was obtained through an illegal search under the Fourth Amendment, and that the trial
court improperly denied his motion to suppress. Id. at 8. The Supreme Court determined that the police
officer had observed unusual conduct by the petitioner, which led him reasonably to conclude in light of
his experience that criminal activity might be afoot. Id. at 30. Furthermore, the officer reasonably believed
that the petitioner may have been armed and presently dangerous, so he justifiably investigated this behavior
by identifying himself as a policeman and making reasonable inquiries. Id. The Court determined that
because nothing in the initial stages of the encounter served to dispel the officer's reasonable fear for his
own or others' safety, he was entitled to conduct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing of the
petitioner in an attempt to discover weapons which might be used to assault him. Id. The Court concluded
that the sole justification for the search in the present situation was the protection of the police officer and
others nearby, and it must have, therefore, been confined in scope to an intrusion reasonably designed to
discover hidden weapons for the assault of the officer. Id. at 29. Consequently, the Court held that the
officer's search was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, and that the weapons seized were properly
introduced in evidence against the petitioner. Id. at 3 1.
16. Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 122.
17. Id. at 122.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 123.
20. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
21. Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 122.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 124 n.2.
24. Id. at 124-125.
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ANALYSIS
The majority opinion, written by Chief Justice Rehnquist, relied on its
holding in Terry to reverse the Supreme Court of Illinois' ruling, and to
determine that Officer Nolan's pat down search of Wardlow was not a Fourth
Amendment violation.2 ' Terry held that an officer must have a reasonable,
articulable suspicion of criminal activity to conduct a brief, investigatory
stop. 26 The Court noted that this conclusion was in compliance with the
mandates of the Fourth Amendment which require "at least a minimal level of
objective justification for making the stop., 27 Specifically, the Terry Court
insisted that an officer be able "to articulate more than an 'inchoate and
unparticularized suspicion or hunch' of criminal activity. 28
According to the Supreme Court, a reasonable suspicion depends on
"commonsense judgments and inferences about human behavior," since no
court can demand "scientific certainty" from police in their decision-making.2 9
To determine whetherNolan acted reasonably in stopping Wardlow, the Court
considered as relevant factors the location in which the stop occurred and the
suspect's reaction to police presence. 30 Although one's location cannot
provide sole justification for search and seizure, an individual's presence in a
high-crime area may be a relevant consideration in determining whether
further investigation is warranted.3 In addition, the Court noted that "nervous,
evasive behavior" is a relevant factor in determining whether reasonable
suspicion to justify a stop exists. 32 Thus, the Court concluded that Wardlow's

presence in an area known for narcotics trafficking, coupled with his
amplejustification forNolan's suspicions that led
unprovoked flight, provided
33
him to stop Wardlow.

The Supreme Court then reasoned that its holding was consistent with its
prior decision in Floridav. Royer,34 which held that when one is approached
by an officer who lacks reasonable suspicion, he is under no obligation to
cooperate with that officer. 5 Justice Rehnquist further explained that "refusal
to cooperate, without more, does not furnish the minimal level of objective

25. Id.at125-126.
26. Id.at123.
27. Id

28. Id. at 124 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 27).
29. Id. at 125.
30. Id. at 124-125.
31. Id at 124.

32.
33.
34.
35.

Id.
Id at 125.
460 U.S. 491 (1983).
Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 125.
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justification needed for a detention or seizure."36 Although flight alone does
not indicate criminal behavior, the possibility of innocent justifications for
flight do not necessarily lead to the conclusion that stopping a fleeing person
is violative of the Fourth Amendment.37 In the present case, the Court
determined that unprovoked flight such as Wardlow's is the opposite of
staying silent, or merely refusing to cooperate by "going about one's
business," as is permitted by Royer.38 In fact, the Court labeled Wardlow's
flight as "the consummate act of evasion" and suggestive of wrongdoing.3 9
Next, the Court compared Wardlow's "unprovoked flight" to the
"suspicious" behavior of the defendants in Terry in order to emphasize that
police officers may conduct a stop to investigate ambiguous behavior, such as
flight, even if an innocent explanation for the behavior might exist.4" In Terry,
the two defendants paced in front of a store and repeatedly peered into its
windows.4 ' A police officer thought that the defendants were planning a
robbery, and that belief provided adequate justification for his stopping and
searching the individuals to investigate further.42 The Court stated that while
the defendants' behavior could have had a lawful explanation, the officer's
objectively reasonable suspicion permitted him to "detain individuals to
resolve the ambiguity. 43
The Court recognized that its ruling in Terry may result in the stopping of
innocent people, but it noted that the "Terry stop is [a far more] ... minimal
intrusion" than that allowed by the Fourth Amendment, which clearly accepts
this risk." A Terry stop merely allows a policeman to investigate a situation
further.4 5 In fact, "if [an] officer does not learn facts rising to the level of
probable cause, the individual must be allowed to go on his way." 46 In
contrast, however, Officer Nolan recovered a handgun during his search of
Wardlow, and consequently arrested him for violating an Illinois firearms
statute.47 Because of Wardlow's presence in a high crime area and due to his
unprovoked flight, the Court concluded that Officer Nolan's stop and frisk was
in compliance with the Fourth Amendment. 48 Accordingly, the Court reversed
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

Id.at
Id.
Id.
Id.at
Id.at
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.at
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.at

125 (quoting Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429 (1991)).
124.
125.

126.

121.
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and remanded the decision of the Supreme Court of Illinois for further
proceedings consistent with its opinion.49
CONCURRENCE AND DISSENT
Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer,
concurred in part and dissented in part with the judgment.5 0 First, Justice
Stevens concurred on the majority's rejection of aperse rule as proposed by
petitioner and respondent.' Next, however, he dissented as to the Court's
evaluation of Officer Nolan's "reasonable suspicion" of Wardlow's
criminality. 5 In contrast to the majority, Justice Stevens was not persuaded
by Officer Nolan's testimony that there existed adequate reason for Nolan to
suspect Wardlow of criminal activity, permitting him to stop and investigate
Wardlow."3
Justice Stevens supported the majority's rejection of a per se rule
regarding the propriety of detaining a person who flees after seeing a police
officer. 4 The State of Illinois argued that temporary detention should be
permitted for anyone who flees at the mere sight of a police officer." On the
other hand, respondent asked the Court to adopt aperse rule stating that flight
after seeing a police officer should neverjustify a temporary stop. 6 According
to Justice Stevens, because varied reasons for flight exist, aper se rule would
inappropriately categorize such behavior, because it would fail to consider the
reasons and circumstances for flight.5 7 Justice Stevens noted that flight does
not always indicate criminal activity since legitimate reasons for flight, such
as one's running to catch a bus, to resume exercise, or to get home for dinner,
could coincide with an officer's presence. On the other hand, Justice Stevens
conceded that one might run from police because he has recently committed
a crime.5 9 In Justice Stevens' view, because of the numerous reasons for
flight, the Court correctly rejected a per se rule that would have treated all
flight in the same manner.60

49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

Id. at 126.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 127.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 126.
Id.
Id. at 126-127.
Id.
Id. at 129.
Id.
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Justice Stevens then recalled the magnitude of the Court's holding in
Terry, in which it declared that police intrusion based on less than probable
cause was constitutional. 6 In Terry, the Court opined that "even a limited
search, constitutes a severe, though brief, intrusion upon cherished personal
security, and it must be an annoying, frightening, and perhaps humiliating
experience. 62 Consequently, the Court justified such stops only in limited
circumstances, recognizing merely a "narrowly drawn authority" for when an
officer reasonably believes he is dealing with an armed and dangerous
individual.63 Justice Stevens distinguished Wardlow's circumstances from
those in Terry.'4 In Terry, the defendants' repeated pacing, conversing, and
searching amounted to suspicious behavior.65 In contrast, Wardlow's only
questionable behavior was fleeing when police were nearby, behavior which
"is not at all like a series of acts...which taken together warrant further
investigation. 66
According to Justice Stevens, the Court was required to consider the
totality of the circumstances in order to determine whether Officer Nolan had
reasonably suspected criminal activity when he stopped and frisked
Wardlow.

67

Because a court should look objectively at all surrounding

circumstances to evaluate the reasonableness of an officer's stop, a crucial
determination is defining what "commonsense conclusions" an officer may
derive from an individual's flight.68 Stevens articulated a number of relevant
factors in considering whether one's flight is objectively suspicious, including
"the time of day, the number of people in the area, the character of the
neighborhood, whether the officer was in uniform...and the person's
behavior.

,,69

The State of Illinois argued that behavior such as "unprovoked flight" is
"aberrant" and "abnormal," suggesting that all unprovoked flight should
justify a stop.7 ° The dissent, however, noted that flight does not always
indicate criminal guilt.7 For instance, one may flee from police in an attempt
to avoid his name appearing in connection with criminal acts or because he
does not wish to deal with the hassle or expense of defending himself.7
61.
62.
63.

Id.at 127.
Id. (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 24-25).
Id. at 128.

64.

Id. at 130 n.4.

65.

Id.

66. Id. (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 22).
67.
68.

Id. at 126-127.
Id. at 128.

69. Id.at 129-130.
70. Id.at 131.

71. Id.
72. Id.
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Furthermore, a person could reasonably infer nearby criminal activity from an
officer's presence.73 In other words, even if an individual runs after seeing the
police, "the inference to be drawn may still vary from case to case. 74
Moreover, substantial evidence shows that it would not be unusual for
minorities in high crime neighborhoods to run from police because many such
people believe that contact with police could be dangerous, even if those
persons are not involved in criminal activity. 5 Justice Stevens cited statistics
demonstrating that people who have witnessed abusive police interrogations
and have seen the arrests of innocent people are inclined to fear police.76
Furthermore, Justice Stevens noted that police are aware that minorities fear
them and he indicated that evidence of such fear among minorities "is too
pervasive to be dismissed as random or rare, and too persuasive to be
disparaged as inconclusive or insufficient. 7 7 Justice Stevens, therefore,
proposed that "[b]ecause many factors providing innocent motivations for
unprovoked flight are concentrated in high crime areas, the character of [such
a] neighborhood arguably makes an inference of guilt less appropriate, rather
than more so., ' 78 Accordingly, a court should consider such factors in its
79
examination of a particular stop.
The second part of Justice Stevens' opinion addresses his disagreement
with the majority's determination that Officer Nolan had reasonable suspicion
to stop respondent.80 Justice Stevens did not think that Wardlow' s standing on
a sidewalk and looking in the officers' direction before running was sufficient
to warrant Officer Nolan's stop.8 ' Justice Stevens emphasized the importance
of examining "the totality of the circumstances" when determining the
reasonableness of an officer's stop and pointed to an insufficiency of evidence
to support an objectively reasonable belief that Wardlow was involved in
criminal activity.82 Justice Stevens noted that Officer Nolan did not testify as
to whether the cars in the police caravan were marked, if anyone else was
standing near Wardlow, how fast the officers were driving, or whether the
respondent noticed any patrol cars other than Nolan's. 83 Nor did Nolan's
testimony establish whether the caravan passed by Wardlow before he ran.84
73. Id.
74. Id.

75. Id. at 132.
76. Id. at 135 n.7.
77.

Id. at 133-134.

78. Id. at 139.
79. Id.

80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

Id. at 137.
Id.at 140.
Id. at 137.
Id. at 138.
Id.
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Furthermore, no police officer testified that he knew of any suspected criminal
activity near the street address where Wardlow stood. 5
The majority's decision that Officer Nolan had a reasonable suspicion to
stop Wardlow rested on its determination that Wardlow's flight was
unprovoked and in a high crime area.86 According to the dissent, these facts
burden of
alone were not enough for the State to adequately meet its
87
"articulat[ing] facts sufficient to support reasonable suspicion."
CONCLUSION
The Court claimed that its analysis in Terry governed the present case,88
yet it only partially applied the Terry analysis. For example, in its evaluation
of Officer Nolan's reasonableness, the Court failed to consider reasonableness
in light of all the circumstances, a critical inquiry under the Fourth
Amendment. 89 The majority stated that Wardlow's location in a high crime
area independently would not warrant a reasonable suspicion of his
criminality.9" Yet, the majority generalized that unprovoked flight indicates
evasiveness, which in a high crime neighborhood justifies an officer's belief
that one is guilty of criminal behavior.
In Terry, the Court carefully parsed out the reasonableness standard and
deliberately restricted its holding to specific circumstances. 91 The Wardlow
majority applied the Terry holding without addressing the disparities between
that holding's strictures and the present case's circumstances. Terry
established that a search in absence of probable cause to arrest "must ...be
strictly circumscribed by the exigencies which justify its initiation" and limited
to a search for weapons intended to harm the officer or other citizens.92
However, the Court in Wardlow never addressed whether Officer Nolan was
afraid for his own or others' safety. Instead, the Court implied that Wardlow's
flight was just as suspicious as the Terry suspects' repeated acts of pacing,
looking in store windows, and conferring.93 In Terry, the Court emphasized
the repetition of those acts, which were completed in an identical manner
about twenty-four times.94 The police officer in Terry recognized those actions
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

Id. at n.16.
Id.at 139.
Id. at 140.
Id.
at 123.
Terry, 392 U.S. at 19.
Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124.
See supra note 15.
Terry, 392 U.S. at 25-26.
Id.
at 23.
Id. at 23.
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as the casing of a robbery. In contrast, Officer Nolan merely witnessed
Wardlow's running from the police caravan. Wardlow's behavior was hardly
repetitious and calculated.
Furthermore, the Terry Court confined its holding to stop and frisks during
which a police officer identified himself as an officer and made reasonable
inquiries of the suspect.95 It emphasized the officer's "tempered act[s]," which
were not "undertaken simply as an act of harassment."96 Specifically, that
officer had asked the suspects their names after "he had observed enough to
make it quite reasonable to fear that they were armed."9 7 The Wardlow
majority never addressed Officer Nolan's failure to identify himself or to make
any inquiries of the petitioner.98
A fairer examination would consider flight in the context of its location
and circumstances. The Court in Terry required more than an officer's good
faith when considering whether an officer was reasonable in his belief that he
was stopping someone involved in criminal activity. 9 In fact, it demanded
that an officer articulate "specific reasonable inferences" drawn from his
experience in the line of duty.' 0 0 The Court reiterated this standard in
Wardlow by stating that an officer must articulate a "particularized suspicion
that [one] is committing a crime," in order to be justified in stopping and
searching that individual. 0' The Court, however, never required such
specificity from Officer Nolan. Officer Nolan's only explanations for
suspecting Wardlow of criminal behavior were his location and flight. The
Court did not consider the number of cars in the caravan, whether the cars
were marked, or how fast the cars were traveling. Surely those factors should
have played a role in the Court's evaluation of the petitioner's flight. Perhaps
the petitioner ran from police because of fears resulting from living in a high
crime neighborhood. If Wardlow had witnessed frequent arrests, many of
them involving innocent citizens, his flight from four police cars speeding
toward him may not have been unreasonable for one living in his
neighborhood. Furthermore, if the cars were unmarked, Wardlow may not
have even realized the caravan was comprised of police officers.
While one's flight may indicate criminality, the Court's limited inquiry
into the circumstances surrounding Wardlow's flight requires little from police
officers in future cases of stops absent probable cause for arrest. The Court's
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.

Id. at 30.
Id. at 28.
Id.
Illinois v. Wardlow, 678 N.E. 2d at 66.
Terry, 392 U.S. at 22.
Id. at 27.
Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124 (quoting Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47 (1979)).
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failure to inquire into the specifics for which Terry calls, sets a dangerous
precedent. By applying Terry incompletely, the court opens the door for
unjustified police stops.
Although the Court in the present case conspicuously fails to mention the
respondent's race, it is obvious that minorities living in high crime
neighborhoods are more likely to be subjected to searches on the basis of this
holding. Because police are aware that minorities fear them, if police
approach a minority citizen who lives in a high crime neighborhood in an
intimidating manner - by speeding, using excessive force, or in large numbers that citizen's running from officers need not indicate criminality. After
Wardlow, police may stop and frisk without being required to explain their
behavior as long as they are patrolling "an area of expected criminal activity"
and a person flees when police are nearby.
While searches are imperative to effective law enforcement, standardless
searching will strain relations between police officers and those living in high
crime communities who are mostly ethnic and racial minorities. When
assessing an officer's reasonableness, a court should consider flight in the
context of crime and circumstance, instead of automatically assuming that
flight indicates a general propensity toward crime. Requiring that officers
conduct searches only in response to a reasonable suspicion that one is
involved in criminal behavior will prevent many unjustified searches of those
who live in high crime neighborhoods, and consequently, will increase
citizens' trust in law enforcement.
Summary and Analysis Prepared by:
Lisa Fry

